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1 Introduction
In this paper, we build a model with three imperfect markets - goods, labor and
credit - and find that goods market frictions drastically change the qualitative and
quantitative dynamics of the labor market, bridging the gap with the data both
in terms of persistence and volatility. Since its inception the Real Business Cycle
literature has faced the same challenge, emphasized in King and Rebelo (1999) and
Cogley and Nason (1995): that of the propagation of technological shocks. In the
standard RBC model, it is necessary to assume large innovations in order to obtain
realistic business cycle fluctuations. Moreover, the standard model cannot generate
the amount of autocorrelation in the growth rate of output that we see in the data.
This twin failing in the lack of both amplification and persistence is even more severe
for search models of unemployment.
Our modeling approach attemps to improve reduce the gap between data and
calibrated statistics as follows. We abstract each friction as a process matching two
sides of a market, expanding the dynamic view of entry and exit of, respectively,
jobs, lending relationships and goods. In particular, we rely on the observation that
the allocation of final goods to end consumers is a costly process: in the US, the
retail sector, for instance, represents more than 5 percent of GDP, suggesting that
a frictionless view of the goods market would be an oversimplification. The relative
supply and demand measures a degree of market tightness: the familiar vacancy to
unemployment ratio for the labor market; the ratio of prospecting consumers and
products on the goods market; and the ratio of investment projects to banks on the
credit market.
Our model aims at understanding the respective role of each market friction for
the dynamic propagation of shocks. Since we are agnostic about the respective role
of frictions in each market, our model will let each frictions play a role and the
calibration will determine their qualitative and quantitative importance. We find
that imperfect goods markets, working through the forward looking nature of job
creation, are the key ingredient changing the qualitative and quantitative responses
of the model to productivity shocks. In particular, the dynamics of the goods market
generate persistence in the growth of the incentives to hire workers, which translates
into responses of labor market tightness to productivity shocks that are hump-shaped,
or highly persistent. During the first stages of an economic expansion, more firms
enter the goods market relative to the change in the eﬀective demand from consumers.
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As these firms generate more revenue, they will distribute more income to consumers
who will raise their eﬀort to reach their desired consumption level. However, in the
immediate aftermath of the shock, the entry of firms causes an increase in congestion
in the goods markets, from the point of view of firms, and a decline in the negotiated
price at which the goods are eventually sold. From the perspective of a firm deciding
to hire a worker, this moderates the incentive to create a vacancy at the beginning of
an expansion as it is less likely the additional production will find an outlet, and if it
does, it sells at a lower price.
The goods market eases, in the sense of there being relatively more demand from
consumers than products competing for customers, only after a few periods. This
decrease in congestion, which also leads to firms obtaining a better price, actually
increases the incentive to recruit workers. Overall, these mechanisms combine to
generate amplification, and persistence, visible by the rise in labor market tightness
for several periods after the initial shock. Propagation arises from the fact that the
economic value of hiring a worker is tied through interesting intertemporal linkages
to congestion and prices on goods markets. These mechanisms are absent from the
standard labor search model and a large class of extensions.
It should be noted that there has also been a revival of the interest in the impact
of demand shocks in goods markets and their implications for the identification and
propagation of technology shocks within the RBC paradigm. Bai et al. (2011), in
independent work, model the process of matching between consumers and firms as a
matching model, with a focus on the respective role of technology shocks and shocks
to the demand side of the market. Our model will generate dynamics of propagation
of income that rely exclusively on productivity shocks, not on consumer or demand
shocks, in contrast with Bai et al. (2011).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the literature
and discuss the evidence motivating our modeling of the goods market. In Section 3,
we develop the model. In Section 4, we calibrate the model to quarterly data, using
evidence on goods market flows, and investigate the sources of propagation in detail.
Section 5 concludes.
2 A brief overview of the literature
Earlier research into propagation in models of the business cycle focused on the labor
market, either increasing the elasticity of labor supply, e.g. models of indivisible
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labor in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), or introducing of a market friction in
the form of wage rigidity.1 The importance of the latter for amplifying the response
of the demand for labor to changes in productivity has received renewed attention
in search models of equilibrium unemployment as a means of addressing the lack of
volatility in job vacancies and unemployment.2
The role of credit markets in amplifying exogenous shocks to economies and the
existence of a financial accelerator has been emphasized in papers such as Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). We take into account the potential
importance of frictional credit markets by introducing a financial accelerator of the
type explored in Wasmer and Weil (2004) and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010).
Both papers have introduced frictions in the labor and credit market and studied,
respectively, the static and dynamic properties of the financial accelerator.
Our main novelty here is to develop a model in which the introduction of goods
market imperfections generates additional insights in a modern theoretical setup. It
has of course been recognized for long that non-clearing or departures from Walrasian
equilibria in goods markets can generate additional unemployment. Several waves of
research have attempted to put this intuition into models (see the survey in Bénassy,
1993). This previous literature has mostly been centered around the idea of price
rigidities leading to excess supply (or demand) of goods, in turn generating ineﬃcient
outcomes in the labor market. In our paper, goods market imperfections will prop-
agate shocks without solely relying on price rigidity. Finally, a large fraction of the
search literature has an explicit focus on frictions in the good market, as in Diamond
(1971, 1982) for instance.
Frictions in the market for delivery goods from producers to end consumers are
important. As an indication, the BEA statistics report that in 2009, wholesale trade
amounts to 5.5% of GDP, while retail trade amounts to 5.8%, suggestive of a costly
allocation of final goods to consumers. The presence of frictions in producers accessing
a distribution network to reach consumers, or consumers acquiring information about
a producer, can explain why new firms face lower demand than comparable older
firms (Foster et al., 2008). These frictions lead to time and costs for both side of the
goods market in searching before acquiring or beginning to consume a good for the
1See, for example, Taylor (1980), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
2This deficiency of the canonical model was shown in Cole and Rogerson (1999) and Shimer
(2005). See also Hall (2005). Other mechanisms were suggested in the literature, such as introducing
on-the-job search (Mortensen and Nagypàl, 2007). Fujita and Ramey (2007) also focus on the lack
of persistence in the growth rates of labor market variables in this class of models.
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first time.
Beyond, new data on goods market flows build on a literature measuring gross
and net creation and destruction flows in the labor and credit markets. Following
the seminal contributions for labor markets of Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992),
Del’Arricia and Garibaldi (2005) have measured creation and destruction in the US
loans market, while, most recently, Broda and Weinstein (2010) have carefully docu-
mented the magnitude of flows of entry and exits of goods, as well as the procyclical
features of net product creation flows. These empirical works point to the directions
theory should take. Their insights have
inspired our work, in particular the details of the modelization and its interpre-
tation. The authors built up and used a unique dataset with 700 000 products with
bar codes purchased by 55 000 households. The covered sectors amount to 40 percent
of all expenditures on goods in the CPI. Their findings, relevant to our approach,
are as follows: they find large flows of entries and exits of “products,” actually four
times more entry and exit in product markets than is found in labor markets, and a
large share of product turnover happens within firms. Further, net product creation
is strongly procyclical and primarily driven by creation rather than destruction. Over
their 9 year sample period, 1994-2003, the product entry rate, defined as the number
of new product codes divided by the stock is 0.78 quarterly. The product exit rate,
defined as the number of disappearing product codes over the stock, is 0.72. Third,
net creation of products is strongly pro-cyclical, and driven by creation as destruction
is weakly counter-cyclical. This suggests that high demand leads to the introduction
of new goods, reminiscent of the implementation cycles in Shleifer (1986).
Our model will follow closely the empirical results: throughout the paper, we will
follow the birth of a “product line”, its development and finally its death due in part
to technological obsolescence, in part due to changes in consumer tastes, and will
calibrate parts of the model based on the creation and destruction statistics above.
3 An economy with goods, labor and credit market
frictions
We consider the case of a firm evaluating marginal investment projects. These projects
first need to obtain financing on the credit market. A financed project is then managed
so as to maximize the value to the firm and the creditor, and needs to hire a worker
to produce a good. In that we will follow the structure in Wasmer and Weil (2004)
and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010). However, the good cannot be sold until a
consumer has been found. Once a match in the goods market is formed, consumers
and producers bargain over the price. The creditor (hereafter named the bank) has
the monopoly over the ability to allocate ressources from one period to the other.
There is no money in this economy, contrary to Berentsen et al. (2011) who study
jointly a search-money framework with labor market frictions with a focus on the
impact of interest rates on unemployment. In particular, we assume that consumer
do not have the ability to transfer wealth from one period to the other. However, this
assumption is not binding as, with search frictions in the goods market, savings will
be shown to be a dominated strategy.
3.1 Financing investment projects
Time is discrete. An investment project is initially in need of a financial partner
(hereafter called a “banker”). This financing will cover the cost of recruiting a worker
and the wage bill when the firm has not found a demand for its product. Prospecting
on the credit market costs κE units of eﬀort per period of time. With probability pt it
finds a banker, and with complementary probability it remains in this stage (denoted
by c like credit). We denote by Jc the asset value of the investment project in this
stage. At the time of the meeting between banker and project, both sides agree on the
terms of a financial contract whereby the resulting costs of the project are financed
by the bank when the project’s cash-flow is negative (in stages 2 and 3) and pays the
banker when the cash-flow is positive (in stage 4).
Now matched with a banker, the project enters the second stage, where it prospects
on the labor market in order to hire a worker. It must pay a per-period cost γ to
maintain an active job vacancy. With probability qt the firm is successful in hiring
a worker, with complementary probability it remains in this stage (denoted by l like
labor). We denote by Jl the asset value of a project in this stage. The firm oﬀers a
wage wt to the worker as long as the firm is active.
In the third stage, now endowed with a worker, the firm could start producing
yt units of output from this particular project and attempt to sell it on the goods
market, but it has no customers. Meeting with a consumer comes with probability
λt, and production can be sold the following period. By assuming that production
involves an operating cost Ω over and above the wage, and that the good cannot be
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stored, the firm chooses not to produce in this stage (denote by g for goods market).
The value of this stage is denoted Jg. Note that the bank is still financing the firm
by transferring the amount of cash necessary to pay the worker. With probability s,
projects are hit by an exogenous destruction shock at the end of the period in this
stage and the next.
In the fourth and final stage, the firm is now matched with a consumer and its
output xt is sold at price Pt. We assume that xt follows a stationary process. Later
on, the process is specificed to be an AR(1), but this assumption is unessential at
this stage. With revenue Ptxt, the firm pays the worker wt, the operating cost Ω, an
amount ￿t to the bank, and enjoys the diﬀerence. We denote this stage by π, standing
for profit, and by Jπ its associated asset value. In addition, the consumer may stop
consuming the particular good produced by this project with probability τ , in which
case the project returns to the previous stage g to search for another consumer.
Finally, as in Pissarides (2000), all profit opportunities are exhausted by new
entrants such that the value of the entry stages are always driven to zero. In the
case of the credit market, this implies that Jc,t ≡ 0 at all times, which is also the
continuation value following the destruction shock s.
Given these assumptions, the Bellman equations of the investment project, which
faces a discount rate r and assuming that transitions from the credit to the labor
market stages occur within a single period, are:
Jc,t = 0 = −κI + ptJl,t (1)
Jl,t = −γ + γ + 1
1 + r
Et [qtJg,t+1 + (1− qt)Jl,t+1] (2)
Jg,t = −wt + wt +
￿
1− s
1 + r
￿
Et [λtJπ,t+1 + (1− λt)Jg,t+1] (3)
Jπ,t = Ptxt − wt − ρt − Ωt +
￿
1− s
1 + r
￿
Et [(1− τ)Jπ,t+1 + τJg,t+1] (4)
The bank’s lifetime closely follows that of the investment project, with values
denoted by Bj, j = c, l, g or π for each of the stages. In stage c, it prospects on the
credit market to find a viable project to finance, which occurs with probability pˆt,
and pays a per period screening cost κB. Free entry on this side of the credit market
implies that Bc,t = 0 at all times. In stage l, the bank pays the cost of a vacancy γ
and waits for the hiring to be realized. In stage g, the bank now pays the wage cost
wt and waits for the firm to be matched with a consumer. In stage π, the bank cashes
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in the repayment ￿t.
The corresponding Bellman equations for the banker are
Bc,t = 0 = −κB + ￿ptBl,t (5)
Bl,t = −γ + 1
1 + r
Et [qtBg,t+1 + (1− qt)Bl,t+1] (6)
Bg,t = −wt +
￿
1− s
1 + r
￿
Et [λtBπ,t+1 + (1− λt)Bg,t+1] (7)
Bπ,t = ρt +
￿
1− s
1 + r
￿
Et [(1− τ)Bπ,t+1 + τBg,t+1] (8)
Going forward, we will be interested in the joint values of a creditor and investment
project, which we refer to as a “firm.” Let the value of a firm for each of the stages be
denoted by Sj,t = Jj,t + Bj,t, with j = c, l, g, π. The Bellman equations for the value
of a firm in each stage can be obtained by summing the corresponding equations for
projects and banks, that is (1) to (4) and (5)to (8). We have, after rearrangement:
Sc,t = 0⇔ κB
pˆt
+
κE
pt
= Sl,t (9)
Sl,t = −γ + 1
1 + r
Et [qtSg,t+1 + (1− qt)Sl,t+1] (10)
Sg,t = −wt +
￿
1− s
1 + r
￿
Et [λtSπ,t+1 + (1− λt)Sg,t+1] (11)
Sπ,t = Ptxt − wt − Ω+
￿
1− s
1 + r
￿
Et [(1− τ)Sπ,t+1 + τSg,t+1] (12)
Equation (9) states that the value of a firm in the hiring stage is equal to the sum of
capitalized search costs paid by each side in the previous credit market stage. This
is driven to zero in the absence of credit market frictions. The formulation the labor
market stage in equation (10) describes the value of a job vacancy as a flow cost
γ and an expected gain from hiring a worker, valued at Sg. As we will discuss in
detail, the presence of a frictional goods markets fundamentally alters the dynamics
of Sg compared to the standard framework through the dynamics of the goods market
meeting rate, λt, and the price, Pt.
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3.2 Search and matching on the goods markets
3.2.1 Matching in the goods market
Consumers may spend a disposable income Y d, which we define below, on either an
essential goods (serving as a numeraire), c0, or a preferred manufactured good, c1.
Consuming the later first requires searching on the goods market. When a consumer
is matched with a manufacturing firm, it purchases the production, xt, at a unit price
Pt. The remaining income is spent on the essential good, which is supplied as a
transfer of resource accross individuals.3
At any point in time in this economy there are matched and unmatched consumers.
Normalizing the mass of consumers to 1, we denote these shares by C1,t and C0,t,
respectively. In equilibrium, these will be the fractions of disposable household income
allocated to either categorie of goods. Unmatched consumers C0,t, exert an average
search eﬀort, e¯t, to find unmatched goods, Ng,t, through a process summarized by a
constant returns to scale function MG(e¯tC0,t,Ng,t). e¯tC0,t can be thought of being the
eﬀective demand for new goods. The meeting rates between consumers and firms are
given by:
MG(e¯tC0,t,Ng,t)
Ng,t = λ(ξt) with λ
￿(ξt) > 0
MG(e¯tC0,t,Ng,t)
e¯tC0,t = λ˜(ξt) with λ˜
￿(ξt) < 0
where ξt = e¯tC0,tNg,t is the natural concept for tightness in the goods market (from the
point of view of consumers) and λ(ξt) = ξtλ˜(ξt). That is, λ˜t, the probability that
an unmatched consumer finds a suitable firm from which to buy goods, is decreasing
in goods market tightness. Conversely, the greater ξt, the greater the demand from
consumers relative to the goods awaiting to find consumers, and the shorter the
duration of search for producers. This creates an important feedback from the goods
market to the labor market as the returns to hiring a worker are greater when it is
easiest to find customers.
3To avoid any further complication, we assume that the numeraire is produced by a technology
without labor: it is therefore the fruit of a Lucas tree with no search friction here. The extension
of our framework along the lines of Berentsen et al. (2011) with money-search would permit richer
intepretations.
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3.2.2 Disposable income
The total net profits in this economy, Πt, are the sum of profit flows to projects and
banks. This corresponds to:
Πt = (Ptxt − Ω)Nπ,t − wtNt − γNl,t − κBc,t
where Nt = Nπ,t +Ng,t is the sum of the number of firms matched with a consumer
Nπ,t, and of the number of firms in stage g Ng,t (that is, matched with a bank and
a worker but not with a consumer). The number of firms prospecting for workers in
stage l is Nl,t and the number of banks screening projects in stage c is Bc,t. In the
equation above, the first term is the revenue generated by firms in stage 4, net of
operating costs. The second term represents wage payments in the economy. The
remaining terms represent the negative cash-flows of the bank during the first stages
due to search costs in labor and credit markets.
These profits net of search costs are pooled and distributed lump sum to workers.
The mass 1 of workers, the unemployed and employed, therefore receive per person
and per period Πt as a cash transfer. Further, resources are pooled across categories
of workers, as in Merz (1995) and Andofaltto (1996). The average disposable income
of a representative consumer is Πt + Ntwt plus an additional lump sum transfer T
distributed to all consumers, matched and unmatched.4 The timing of the transmis-
sion of income from firms to consumer within a period corresponds to ths simplest
possible assumption, and also the most natural.5
3.2.3 Value functions for consumers
Individuals want to consume manufactured goods but may not buy them before
prospecting on the goods market. Let us denote by D0,t and D1,t the values for
a consumer of being unmatched and matched, respectively. The generic utility of
consuming both goods is denoted by v(c1, c0), where c1 and c0 are the consumption
of the manufactured good (subject to search frictions) and the essential goods (not
subject to search frictions). Unmatched consumers search for a good at an eﬀort cost
4This lump sum transfer has no consequence on the price level, determined later on and simply
ensures the balancing of the budget of a matched consumer. For unmatched consumers, this simply
raises the consumption of the numeraire.
5Alternative specifications, where the disposable income in t would be generated through profits
and sales from period t− 1 would aﬀect the dynamics and add up a source of lags, which we avoid
here by our specification: the dynamic path we obtained is thus not slowed down artificially.
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σ(e), with σ￿(e) > 0, σ￿￿(e) ≥ 0 and σ(0) = 0, and perceive their search eﬀort as
influencing their eﬀective finding rate, etλ˜t. Consequently, we have:
D0,t = v(0, c0,t)− σ(et) + 1
1 + r
Et
￿
etλ˜tD1,t+1 + (1− λ˜tet)D0,t+1
￿
(13)
D1,t = v(c1,t, c0,t) +
￿
1− s
1 + r
￿
Et [τD0,t+1 + (1− τ)D1,t+1] + s
1 + r
EtD0,t+1 (14)
Assuming the manufactured good has greater marginal utility, matched consumers
will always spend up to Ptxt on c1,t and then expend what is left, Y dt − Ptxt, on c0,t.
In other words, the utility in the first equation (unmatched consumer) is v(0, Y dt ) and
the utility in the second equation (matched consumer) will be v(xt, Y dt −Ptxt). In the
current version, we assume a marginal utility for c1 of Φ > 0 and that the essential
good provides a basic level of utility independent of the quantity consumed (we think
of food and utilities, for example). We also discuss in appendix why the assumption
of the absence of savings by consumers is not binding.
3.2.4 Optimal search eﬀort
The optimal individual search eﬀort is simply given by a condition equating the
marginal cost of eﬀort to the discounted, expected benefit yielded by that marginal
unit of eﬀort:
σ￿(e∗t ) =
λ˜t
1 + r
Et [(D1,t+1 −D0,t+1)] (15)
and it follows that all consumers exert the same eﬀort :
e∗t = e¯t
Equation (15) implies that consumer search eﬀort is increasing in the expected capital
gain from consuming the manufactured good. Combining the first order condition
above and the derivation of value equations for consumers, we can see that the level
of eﬀort will depend on the gains from consumption next period, that is, from the
diﬀerence in utility between being matched and unmatched. Both disposable income
and the dynamics of the price P , play a determining role in this respect as :
σ￿(e¯t) =
λ˜t
1 + r
Et
￿
i=0
ψi
￿￿
Φ
Pt+1+i − 1
￿
Y dt+1+i + σ˜(et+1+i)
￿
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where ψ ≡ (1− τ) 1−s1+r is a discount factor, Φ is the marginal utility from consuming
c1 and σ˜(et) ≡ σ(et)− etσ￿(et).
3.2.5 Determining the dynamics of the goods surplus and price
Consistent with the search literature, we postulate that the price Pt is bargained
between a consumer and a firm. The total surplus to the consumption relation-
ship is Gt = (Sπ,t − Sg,t) + (D1,t −D0,t). The price for the good is determined as
Pt = argmax
Pt
(Sπ,t − Sg,t)1−δ (D1,t −D0,t)δ, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the share of the goods
surplus Gt going to the consumer. This results in the sharing rule
(1− δ) (D1,t −D0,t) = δ (Sπ,t − Sg,t) (16)
Introducing the notation for the elasticity of the eﬀort cost function, ησ > 0, we
then obtain the negotiated price rule as:
Ptxt = (1− δ) [Φxt + (1− ησ)σ(e)] + δΩ+ (1− δ)λt1− s
1 + r
Et [δGt+1]
which emphasizes the forward looking aspect of price determination: today’s price is
increasing in the expectation of tomorrow’s surplus on the goods market.6 Finally,
we obtain which first states the that price is increasing in the marginal utility Φ.
The cost of consumer search eﬀort puts σ(e¯t) downward pressure on the price if the
elasticity ησ > 1. Finally, the negotiated price is increasing in goods market tightness
ξt: the greater the eﬀective demand on the consumer side relative to the supply of
unmatched goods Ng, the greater the price and hence profits for firms.
3.3 Matching in other markets
3.3.1 Matching in the labor market and wage determination
We assume that matching in the labor market is governed by a function ML(Nl,t, ut),
where ut is the rate of unemployment and the total number of unemployed workers
since the labor force is normalized to 1. Nl,t , already defined as the number of firms
in stage l, is also the number of "vacancies." The function is assumed to be constant
returns to scale, hence the rate at which firms fill vacancies is a function of the ratio
Nl,t/ut = θt, a measure of the tightness of the labor market. This rate, q(θt), is given
6The details of the derivation for this and subsequent equations are provided in the appendix.
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by
q(θt) =
ML(Nl,t, ut)
Nl,t with q
￿(θt) < 0.
Conversely, the rate at which the unemployed find a job is
ML(Nl,t, ut)
ut
= θtq(θt) = f(θt) with f ￿(θt) < 0.
Once employed, workers earn a wage wt, which we assume, for simplicity, takes the
functional form
wt = χw(Ptxt)ηw (17)
where ηw can be interpreted as the elasticity of wages to the marginal product of
labor Ptyt. In the spirit of search models, one may want to have a wage schedule
as the outcome of Nash-bargaining between the firm and the worker. We decided to
avoid the complications implied by Nash-bargaining in this context in order, focusing
on the role played by the elasticity of wages to productivity for propagation, thus
leaving aside the question of bargaining in this context for future work.7
3.3.2 Matching in the credit market and bargaining on loan repayment
The matching rates pt and ￿pt are made mutually consistent by the existence of a
matching function MC(Bc,t,Nc,t), where Bc,t (already defined) and Nc,t are, respec-
tively, the number of bankers and projects in stage c. This function is assumed to
have constant returns to scale. Hence, denoting by φt the ratio Nc,t/Bc,t, which is a
reflection tightness of the credit market from the point of view of projects, we have
pt =
MC(Bc,t,Nc,t)
Nc = p(φt) with p
￿(φt) < 0. (18)
￿pt = φtp(φt) with ￿p￿(φt) > 0. (19)
The division of rents from implementing a project, Sl,t, are determined by bar-
gaining about ￿ upon meeting. Calling β ∈ (0, 1) the bargaining power of the bank,
7Some complications with bargaining are as follows. First, given that firms pays the worker in
two diﬀerent stages (when it does not produce and when it does), this would imply not one but
two wage schedules, with analytical complications but for a small quantitative diﬀerence since the
surplus value of the firm in each stage are very close and exactly equal when the discount rate is
small compared to the rate at which it finds a consumer. Hence, a similar wage rule in the two stages
is a quantitatively good assumption. Second, given the number of parties, several complexities arise
in which we would need to make assumptions on timing and bargaining structure. We ignore these
here by choosing a rather simple wage determination rule.
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the Nash-bargaining condition
(1− β)Bl,t = βJl,t (20)
states that with β = 1 the bank receives all the surplus. Note that the rule for ￿ is
determined at the time of the meeting but paid a few periods after the negotiation,
when the firms becomes profitable. We assume that there is no commitment problem
(as in Wasmer and Weil 2004) so that any new realization of aggregate productivity
will not undo the financial contract and there is no renegotiation.
Combining (1), (5) and (20), as well as the definition of ￿p in (19), we can obtain
the equilibrium value of φt denoted by φ∗ with
φ∗ =
κB
κE
1− β
β
∀t (21)
Free-entry of both banks and projects on credit markets implies a credit market
tightness that is constant over time, even out of the steady-state. Going forward, all
the information pertaining to the credit market is contained in the total transaction
costs paid by both firms and banks in stage c:
K(φ∗) ≡ κB
φ∗p(φ∗)
+
κE
p(φ∗)
(22)
3.4 Stocks of consumers, employment and unemployment
Having stipulated the transition rates for all agents in the economy, we can now write
the laws of motion for the stocks of consumers, firms and, consequently, employment.
Potential consumers C0 become consumers the period after meeting a producer, and
a fraction 0 < τ < 1 of current consumers separate from their product only to return
to the pool of potential consumers the following period. The stocks of consumers in
the goods market therefore evolve according to:
C0,t+1 = (1− λ˜t)C0,t + [s+ (1− s)τ ] C1,t (23)
C1,t+1 = (1− s)(1− τ)C1,t + λ˜tC0,t (24)
There is an inflow q(θt)Nl,t into the stock of firms searching on the goods market
every period, where Nl,t is the number of vacancies at time t. To this, (1 − s)τNπ,t
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firms separated from consumers lead the stocks Ng and Nπ to evolve according to:
Ng,t+1 = (1− s)(1− λt)Ng,t + (1− s)τNπ,t + q(θt)Nl,t (25)
Nπ,t+1 = (1− s)(1− τ)Nπ,t + (1− s)λtNg,t (26)
Finally, the dynamics of aggregate unemployment and employment are then given by
ut+1 = s(1− ut) + (1− f(θt))ut (27)
1− ut = Ng,t +Nπ,t (28)
3.5 Looking into the sources of propagation
The central equation relating labor market tightness and the expected value of hiring
a worker, equation (10), lies at the heart of propagation in this class of models. In
combination with (9) and calling ot(r) ≡ r
￿
1/q(θt)−1
1+r
￿
a term vanishing as the discount
rate goes to zero, this is:
K(φ∗)(1 + ot(r)) +
γ
q(θt)
=
1
1 + r
EtSg,t+1 (29)
which equates the average cost of creating a job - the left-hand side, equal to the
financial costs properly discounted, K(φ), and the expected costs of search on the
labor market, γ/q(θt) - to the discounted expected value of a worker to the firm in
the goods market stage (the right-hand side). A few words of comparison with the
canonical search model are warranted here. First, the costs of financial intermediation
enter the left hand side of the equation and place a lower bound on the value of
a “vacancy” to a firm. Absent credit market frictions the average cost of creation
depends on the flow cost of a vacancy γ and congestion on the labor market. Second,
the expected value on the right hand side corresponds to the ability to produce and
sell a good once a consumer has been located. Under frictionless goods markets, the
right hand side is simply the value of the profit stage. Thus the current model nest
the canonical search model when K(φ∗) tends to zero and the goods market friction
is removed.
A log-linear approximation around the deterministic steady state of this job cre-
ation condition yields
￿θt = 1
ηL
Sg
Sg −K(φ)Et
￿Sg,t+1 (30)
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where ηL is the elasticity of the job filling rate with respect to labor market tightness
and “hatted” variables indicate proportional deviations from the steady state. Over
and above the amplification of changes in Sg from frictions in the labor market,
measured as the inverse of the elasticity of the labor matching function, frictions in
credit markets create an amplifying factor of SgSg−K(φ) . This financial accelerator is
decreasing in the firm’s surplus to hiring a worker, Sg −K(φ), and its full potential
is explored in detail in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010).
Goods market frictions fundamentally change the dynamics of Sg along two di-
mensions: 1) the expected likelihood of reaching the profit stage in the period after
hiring the worker, λ; 2) the expect profit flow, which is now dependent on the expec-
tation of what price the goods will fetch on the market, P . In order to see this more
clearly, recall that the values of the goods market stage derived earlier is a function
F of goods market frictions λt, of the initial payoﬀ of the firm π0,t and the profits
stage Sπ:
Sg,t = F (π0,t,λt) = π0,t +
￿
1− s
1 + r
￿
Et [λtSπ,t+1 + (1− λt)Sg,t+1]
with π0,t = −wt. It can be observed that when λt ≡ 1 and π0,t = xt − wt, F (π0,t,λt)
converges to the Mortensen-Pissarides world in which the value of the goods market
stage is SMPg,t = xt − wt +
￿
1−s
1+r
￿
EtSMPg,t+1. From the recursive nature of SMPg,t , all that
matters for the dynamics of labor market tightness is the expected path of the net
profit flow x− wt. By comparison, congestion in the goods market through λt aﬀect
the duration of the costly stage g before reach the profit stage π, with the later being
aﬀect by the negotiated price P .
4 Quantitative results
We begin by detailing our calibration strategy. Next, we present the quantitative
results for the full model and discuss in detail the sources of propagation. This
section also presents some robustness results with respect to parameters of the goods
market and compares the role of the diﬀerent market frictions.
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Table 1: Targeted moments: goods, labor and credit markets
Unemployment rate u 10%
Wage rate w/P 0.75
Average recruiting cost over wage bill [γNl/q(θ)]/(wN ) 3%
Unmatched goods Ng/N 19%
Consumer matching rate λ˜ 0.75
Consumer search eﬀort C0σ(e¯)/wN 0.1
Share of essential good in consumption (C0ExpC0,0 + C1ExpC1,0) /Y d 15%
Mark-up over marginal cost P/ (Ngw +Nπ(w + Ω))− 1 15%
Share of financial sector in GDP Σ 3%
4.1 Calibration strategy
We consider the basic unit of time to be a quarter and calibrate the model accord-
ingly. The risk free rate r is set to 1%, corresponding to an annualized return close
to the historical average on 3-month Treasury bills. The labor and goods market
parameters are determined by matching a set of first moments, presented in Table 1
and discussed below. For all parameters the match with the moments is exact, with
the exception of the bargaining weight δ for which we do not have a target, and the
autocorrelation coeﬃcients. We instead estimate the values of the AR(1) parameters
and the consumer bargaining weight δ by maximizing the likelihood of the rational ex-
pectations solution to a linear approximation of the model on quarterly data for labor
market tightness over the period 1977:1 to 2004:3. This estimation procedure yields
parameter estimates for technology presented in Table 2. The typical productivity
shock is a 1% deviation.8 The estimated consumer bargaining weight is δ = 0.34.
We target an average rate of unemployment of 10%, midway between the values
in Cole and Rogerson (1999) and Shimer (2005). In addition, we require recruiting
costs to represent 3% of the wage bill in steady state, consistent with the evidence
reported in Silva and Toledo (2007). Based on the evidence in Davis et al. (2006),
we set the exogenous job separation rate to s = 0.05. The elasticity of the labor
matching function, ML(Nl, u) = χLN 1−ηLl uηL , is set to ηL = 0.5, in the mid-range of
8This is small enough to make sure that the saving motive is limited even if we had assumed
a concave utility function. Indeed, since the consumers pool the unemployment risk, individual
consumers do not face unemployment shocks, and the only income fluctuations arise from these
very small perturbations in productivity. Hence, a concave utility would then be well approximated
locally by a linear utility.
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Table 2: Baseline parameter values
Labor market Goods market
job separation rate s 0.05 goods exit rate τ 0.01
matching elasticity ηL 0.5 matching level param. χG 0.52
wage elasticity ηw 0.5 matching elasticity ηG 0.5
matching level param. χL 0.58 consumer barg. weight δ 0.34
wage level param. χw 0.57 cost function - level χσ 0.55
vacancy cost γ 0.01 cost function - elasticity ησ 6.22
Marginal utility of c1 Φ 0.64
Credit market Technology
bank’s barg. weight β 0.27 labor productivity x 1
matching elasticity ηC 0.5 persistence param. ρx 0.975
matching level param. χC 1.9 standard deviation σx 0.01
search costs κ = c 0.05 risk free rate r 0.01
values reported in the survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The elasticity of
the wage to the marginal product is set to 0.5, close to the value suggested by Gertler
and Trigari (2009). We also target the wage to be 75% of the marginal revenue of
a sale P , the reminding 25% being shared between the firm and the bank, through
repayment ρ.
Only firms matched with a consumer sell their goods in this economy, thus workers
associated with projects that are not selling their goods are, in a sense, un-utilized
capacity. We thus target a capacity utilization rate of 81%, similar to the calibration
in Bai et al. (2011). These authors target a capacity utilization rate in the consump-
tion sector of 81% based on the Federal Reserve’s Statistical Release of Industrial
Production and Capacity Utilization. Finally, the cost parameter Ω is adjusted to
match a 15% price mark-up over marginal cost.
With respect to consumer search, we target an average search duration of a little
over 5 weeks before finding and deciding on a new consumption good, implying λ˜ =
0.75. Given our other calibration targets, the steady state rate of product entry,
defined as λ˜C0/C1, is 0.25 on an annualized basis. This is consistent with the product
entry rate, weighted by expenditure shares, found by Broda and Weinstein (2010).
The goods market matching function is assumed to take the form MG(e¯C0,Ng) =
χG (e¯C0)1−ηG N ηGg and we assume an elasticity of 0.5, performing a series of sensitivity
tests below. To calibrate the eﬀort placed into the search for consumption goods, we
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rely on the BLS’ time use survey which reports that households spend on average
half an hour a day purchasing goods and services (0.4 hours for men, 0.6 for women).
Of course, this is not necessarily time spent searching and comparing goods before
making a choice. Nor does it include travel related to these activities. Assuming
an individual works on average 5 hours a day, spread over a week, the cost of time
searching in the goods market corresponds to approximately 10% of wage income.
That is, we target C0σ(e¯)/wN ￿ 0.1. The product exit rate is given by s+ (1− s)τ ,
which Broda and Weinstein found to be 0.24 at an annual frequency (weighted by
expenditure shares). This implies quarterly goods separation rate of τ = 0.011.
Finally, we target an expenditure share in the essential good based on the Household
Consumption Expenditure survey’s average annual expenditure on food consumed at
home, plus utilities, over the period 1984 to 2009. This amounts to 15% of total annual
expenditures. In the model, this share is defined as (C0ExpC0,0 + C1ExpC1,0) /Y d,
where ExpC1,0 = Y d − P is the expenditure on the essential good of a matched
consumer, and ExpC0,0 = Y d the expenditure of an unmatched consumer. These
expenditures are weighted by the fraction of unmatched and matched consumer.
The calibration of the credit market requires choosing parameters of the credit
matching function, assumed to be of the form Mc(Bc,Nc) = χCN 1−ηCc BηCc , the costs
of prospecting on credit markets and the bargaining weight β, and follows Petrosky-
Nadeau and Wasmer (2010). We assume symmetry in prospecting costs κ = c, and
the remaining parameters, χC , ηC and β, are adjusted to accommodate a targeted
share of corporate lending in GDP equal to 3%, using national account data and
calculations described in the appendix. In the model this share is calculated from
Σ =
Bπ￿− Bgw − Blγ − Bcκ
Y d
4.2 Results
In the benchmark economy with frictions in the three markets, as reported in Figure
1, labor market tightness and the value of filled vacancy Sg reach their peak 11
periods after the realization of the shock to technology. The evolution of labor market
tightness is driven by the expected value of hiring a worker, as displayed in the top
right panel of Figure 1. The inverted U-shape for the response of labor market
tightness is not a frequent property in most economic models, yet is a feature of the
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Figure 1: Goods market frictions - inspecting the mechanism. IRFs to a positive
productivity shock
data (see Fujita and Ramey, 2007) our model achieves through mechanisms described
below.
In the bottom panels of Figure 1, we study the various channels at work, in
particular the intertemporal linkages between the labor and goods markets. Firms
expect next period to face a drop in the likelihood of selling their goods following
recruiting a worker. The reason being that there will be an inflow of vacancies today,
leading to more supply of goods tomorrow due to more firms matched with a worker
and able to look for consumers. On the other hand, search eﬀort by consumers will
also rise, contributing to an increase in the probability of selling for firms, but this
eﬀect is dominated by the first one and overall, λt will decrease. As productivity
reverts to its trend, conditions on goods market improve over time for firms as the
inflow of new goods on the market slows relative to the increases in eﬀective demand
by searching consumers both in terms of market congestion and the price at which
firms sell their product. The evolution of the goods market thus creates increasing
incentives to hire workers even as productivity and the profit flow are returning to
trend.
Table 4 reports the business cycles characteristics of labor market variables, along
with those for aggregate consumption and output. The baseline calibrated model
comes close to replicating the amount of volatility of labor market tightness seen in
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Table 3: Unconditional second moments - goods market variables
Goods market a b a b
Tightness ξ 1.37 -0.69 Consumer search eﬀort e 0.65 0.91
Firms hazard rate λ 0.69 -0.69 Unmatched consumers C0 0.53 -0.64
Consumer hazard rate λ˜ 0.69 0.69 Unmatched firms Ng 1.71 0.70
Price of goods c1 P 0.49 -0.79
a: standard deviation relative to output; b: contemporaneous correlation with output. All moments are HP filtered
the data, generating a standard deviation relative to that of ouput of 11.10. The same
is true for the volatilities of vacancies and unemployment, and the contemporaneous
correlations of each variable with the cyclical component of aggregate output is con-
sistent with the data. However, the main improvement over the existing literature lies
in the last rows of Table 4. They report the autocorrelation of output and labor mar-
ket tightness growth rates at the first three lags. This measure indicates that goods
market frictions generate a substantial amount of persistence in the dynamics of the
labor market: it is positive, around 0.17, largely above the corresponding measures
in the models without goods market frictions (last column, -0.01), yet still below the
data (0.61).
The next table summarizes the business cycle dynamics of the goods market by
presenting a series of second moments for goods market variables, in terms of H.-P.
filtered standard deviations relative to output and contemporaneous correlations with
output. Focusing first on congestion in the goods market, tightness ξ = e¯C0/N g is
countercyclical, consumers match more quickly with goods in a boom while, as we
mentioned, the matching rate of firms λ is countercyclical. The number of unmatched
firms, or goods on the market searching for consumers, is greater during an expansion,
capturing a notion as in Shleifer (1986) of booms being periods when more projects are
implemented. Consumers search eﬀort is pro-cyclical while the fraction of unmatched
consumers is counter-cyclical.
Summarizing, this model with search frictions in the goods market features a
lagged response of the demand side of the goods market to productivity shocks,
both directly through the income distributed to consumers, and indirectly through
consumer eﬀort and prices. As compared to Bai et al. (2011), we don’t rely on
consumer demand shocks: the endogenous response of the consumer side of the market
amplifies and propagates productivity shocks.
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Figure 2: Comparing frictions: IFS to a positive productivity shock
4.3 The respective role of diﬀerent market frictions
In order to assess the role of each frictions, we will now compare the previous results
with two alternatives: one in which we have frictions in the goods and labor markets
(perfect financial markets, K = 0) and one in which we only have frictions in the
labor market (a Mortensen-Pissarides economy). These alternative economies were
calibrated in order to match the same statistics for unemployment.9
Figure 2 illustrates the response of these diﬀerent calibrated economies by plot-
ing the impulse response of labor market tightness to a positive productivity shock.
Compared to the benchmark economy, there is still a peak in the impulse response
function when there are frictions both in the goods and in the labor market, but at
a lower level. Indeed, in this calibration with goods market frictions, the absence of
financial market imperfections has a relatively moderate impact.10
There is instead a very classical response of the economy with only labor market
frictions, with little amplification and persistence. This is because, for most wage
rules, labor market tightness simply follows the path of the process for productivity.
This shows a contrario that search frictions in the goods market, by generating a
snowball eﬀect between entry of firms and redistribution to consumers, is responsi-
ble for the increasing part of the inverted U-shape curve of labor market tightness
discussed above.
Table 4 reports the corresponding business cycle moments from these models and
9An alternative is to preserve the parameter values obtained in the baseline calibration the model,
successively removing the diﬀerent market frictions. The business cycle moments of the resulting
economies would be diﬃcult to compare.
10This result is in contrast with Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010) and Petrosky-Nadeau (2010)
where, in the absence of good market frictions, the role of financial market imperfections was much
more important and lead to a greater financial multiplier. In that sense, financial and goods market
frictions are substitutes in producing volatility.
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Table 4: Second moments - comparing frictions
US data
Goods, labor
and credit
Goods & labor Labor only
a b a b a b a b
Vacancies 8.83 0.89 7.51 0.94 7.18 0.92 3.09 0.88
Unemployment 6.82 -0.88 5.00 -0.81 4.72 -0.81 0.16 -0.67
Labor tightness 15.41 0.90 11.10 0.99 10.50 0.99 3.20 0.88
Wage 0.40 0.44 0.29 0.61 0.29 0.66 0.40 0.88
Consumption 0.59 0.80 0.68 0.89 0.65 0.89 0.66 0.75
σ(GDP ) 1.40 1.13 1.13 1.18
Persistence: GDP θ GDP θ GDP θ GDP θ
corr(∆zt,∆zt−1) 0.24 0.61 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.14 0.26 -0.01
corr(∆zt,∆zt−2) 0.19 0.40 0.26 0.18 0.24 0.14 0.21 -0.01
corr(∆zt,∆zt−3) 0.05 0.30 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.18 0
Notes: H.-P. filtered (a) standard deviation relative to GDP; (b) contemporaneous correlation
with GDP. Data sources: B.E.A., B.L.S. and Conference Board, 1977:Q1 to 2007:Q4.
summarizes the empirical shortcomings of the canonical search model of unemploy-
ment. The first concern is the well known lack of amplification of productivity shocks:
labor market tightness is nearly 15 time more volatile than GDP over the business
cycle whereas the model generates of relative volatility of 3. The second concerns
persistence, measured by autocorrelation in growth rates. Labor market tightness is
very persistent in the data, much more so than GDP, whereas the canonical model
generates no persistence: θ follows exactly the shock process. Table 4 also reveals that
goods market frictions contribute most to improving the qualitative and quantitive
dynamics of labor market variables.
4.4 Robustness to alternative parametrizations
We now verify whether the elasticity of the goods matching function ηG and the
consumer’s bargaining weight δ aﬀect the responses of the variables that are key
for propagation through the goods market. Figure 3 plots the impulse responses to
the same technological innovation of labor market tightness, Sg and its determinants
when we increase the bargaining weight δ from 0.34 to 0.5, or when we reduce the
elasticity ηG from 0.5 to 0.25. Table 5 reports the filtered second moments for each
scenario.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a positive productivity shock- Baseline and Sensitivity
to goods market parameters ηG and δ
Increasing the share of the goods surplus accruing to the consumer implies a
stronger downward response of the price following the shock and, although the goods
matching rate for firms λ still drops at first, its return to steady state is very pro-
gressive. The result is much more muted response of the value of hiring a worker,
with a modest “hump”. The persistence of labor market tightness is thus only a third
of what it was under the baseline parameter values, and the relative volatility of θ
decreases from 11.10 to 7.04. On the other hand, reducing the elasticity of the goods
matching function has only a minor impact on the quantitative results: the second
moments in Table 5 are mostly the same as in the baseline parameterization.
We perform a final sensitivity analysis in this Section in which we set the elas-
ticities of the labor and goods matching function both to 0.25, retain the estimated
value for the bargaining weight of 0.34. While this has little impact on the relative
volatility of labor market tightness, there is a much stronger response of employment
and output to the same changes in market tightness θ. As the job finding rate varies
more over the business cycle, there is a significant increase in the relative volatility
of unemployment reinforcing the feedback between labor and goods markets and,
in terms of persistence, the model is now much closer to the autocorrelation in the
growth rate of θ measured in the data.
24
Table 5: Business cycle moments and sensitivity to goods market parameters
Baseline
δ = 0.34, ηG = 0.5
Consumer
barg. δ = 0.5
Goods Match.
ηG = 0.25
ηL = ηG = 0.25,
δ = 0.34
a b a b a b a b
Vacancies 7.51 0.94 5.04 0.91 7.04 0.95 5.83 0.73
Unemployment 5.00 -0.81 3.17 -0.76 4.68 -0.79 7.47 -0.90
Labor tightness 11.10 0.99 7.04 0.99 10.41 0.99 11.08 0.99
Wage 0.29 0.61 0.31 0.65 0.31 0.73 0.24 0.53
Consumption 0.68 0.89 0.65 0.81 0.71 0.92 0.81 0.97
σ(GDP ) 1.13 1.03 1.08 1.47
Persistence: GDP θ GDP θ GDP θ GDP θ
corr(∆zt,∆zt−1) 0.06 0.17 0.003 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.31 0.33
corr(∆zt,∆zt−2) 0.26 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.44 0.29
corr(∆zt,∆zt−3) 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.32 0.24
Notes: H.-P. filtered (a) standard deviation relative to GDP; (b) contemporaneous correlation
with GDP.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the significance of goods market frictions for the dynamics of
the labor market in particular, and the macroeconomy in general. The model with
search frictions in the goods market features a lagged response of the demand side
of the goods market to productivity shocks, acting through the income distributed
to consumers. This aﬀects consumer search eﬀort for goods and negotiated prices
leading to rich intertemporal linkages between labor and goods markets.
We find that the feedback from goods to labor markets significantly aﬀects the
qualitative and quantitative features of labor market dynamics. During the first stages
of an economic expansion, more firms enter the goods market and more profits are
generated. The additional redistributed revenues push consumers to raise their search
eﬀort in order to achieve a higher desired level of consumption. Simultaneously, the
inflows of new firms causes an increase in congestion in the goods markets, from the
point of view of firms, and a decline in the negotiated price at which the goods are
eventually sold, dampening the incentive to create a vacancy at the beginning of an
expansion.
Overall, we account for a rise in labor market tightness for several periods after
the initial shock through improved conditions in the goods market for firms in the
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later stages of an expansion. Our model features the propagation of supply shocks
through the demand side of the economy, contrary to the standard labor search model
and a large class of its extensions.
In contrast, the steady-state properties of the model are rather diﬀerent. In a
companion paper, Wasmer (2009) had explored these properties and found instead,
little amplification from the good market. The reason is that in the steady-state
the demand and the supply of goods always match and cannot drift away from each
other, since all the income generated by firms is distributed to consumers without the
interesting dynamics studied here.
Finally, our model of a frictional economy is a natural framework for introducing
additional sources of shocks, in particular demand shocks and money as in Berentsen
et al. (2011). This is left to future work.
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Appendix
A Data used in calibration
In order to calculate the financial sector’s share of aggregate value added, we rely on
the BEA’s industry value added tables available at http://www.bea.gov/industry/io_
histannual.htm. Because of i) changes in industry labels in 1987; and ii) a change of
classifications in 1998, we report the exact series used for each time period:
• 1947 to 1987: we sum the value added of “banking” (code 60), “Credit agencies
other than banks” (code 61) and “Security and commodity brokers” ( code 62).
• 1987 to 1998: we sum the vale added of “Depositary institutions” (code 60),
“Non-depositary institutions” (code 61) and “Security and commodity brokers”
(code 62).
• 1998 to 2009: we sum the value added of “Federal Reserve banks, credit inter-
mediation, and related activities” (code 521 and 522), “Securities, commodity
contracts, and investments” (code 523) and “Funds, trusts, and other financial
vehicles” (code 525).
The share Σ is obtained by dividing by the corresponding year’s aggregate GDP from
the same value added tables.
Data on consumption expenditure is obtain from BLS series CXUTE000201 on
Total average annual expenditures, series CXUFH000201 for food consumed at home
and series CXUUT000101 for Utilities, fuels, and public services, covering the years
1984-2009
B Determinations of price Pt
Utility
We begin by assuming a quasi-linear form for consumer utility:
U(c1,t, c0,t) = v(c1,t) + c0,t
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Given these preferences, we can determine the negotated price for the good c1 as
the outcome of Nash bargaing over the consumption surplus Gt = (Sπ,t − Sg,t) +
(D1,t −D0,t). δ ∈ (0, 1) will be the consumer’s bargaining weight. As a first step, we
derive expressions for the surplus to the consumption relationship for each side of the
market. We have a budget constraint per period (since we assume no savings):
Ptc1,t + c0,t = Y dt
Consumer surplus
When matched, the consumer consumes what is available, that is
c1,t = xt
Recall the Bellman equations for unmatched and matched consumers:
D0,t = c0,t − σ(et) + 1
1 + r
Et
￿
etλ˜tD1,t+1 + (1− λ˜tet)D0,t+1
￿
= Y dt − σ(et) +
1
1 + r
Et
￿
etλ˜tD1,t+1 + (1− λ˜tet)D0,t+1
￿
D1,t = v(c1,t) + Y
d
t − Ptc1,t +
￿
1− s
1 + r
￿
Et [τD0,t+1 + (1− τ)D1,t+1] + s
1 + r
EtD0,t+1
= v(xt) + Y
d
t − Ptxt
Then the surplus to a match for a consumer is
D1,t −D0,t = v(xt)− Ptxt + σ(et) + τ 1− s
1 + r
Et [D0,t+1 −D1,t+1]
+
1− s
1 + r
EtD1,t+1 +
s
1 + r
EtD0,t+1
−λ˜tet 1
1 + r
Et [D1,t+1 −D0,t+1]− 1
1 + r
EtD0,t+1
From the optimal choice of eﬀort, we had that λ˜tet 11+rEt [D1,t+1 −D0,t+1] = etσ￿(et).
Hence,
D1,t −D0,t = v(xt)− Ptxt + σ(et)− etσ￿(et) + τ 1− s
1 + r
Et [D0,t+1 −D1,t+1]
+
1− s
1 + r
Et [D1,t+1 −D0,t+1]
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D1,t −D0,t = v(xt)− Ptxt + σ(et)− etσ￿(et) + (1− τ)1− s
1 + r
Et [D1,t+1 −D0,t+1]
Firm surplus
Turning to the surplus of a consumption match for a firm, we have
Sπ,t − Sg,t = Ptxt − Ω− τ 1− s
1 + r
Et [Sπ,t+1 − Sg,t+1] + 1− s
1 + r
EtSπ,t+1
−λt1− s
1 + r
Et [Sπ,t+1 − Sg,t+1]− 1− s
1 + r
EtSg,t+1
Sπ,t − Sg,t = Ptxt − Ω+ (1− τ − λt)1− s
1 + r
Et [Sπ,t+1 − Sg,t+1]
Sharing rule
Pt = argmax
Pt
(Sπ,t − Sg,t)1−δ (D1,t −D0,t)δ. Since ∂ (Sπ,t − Sg,t) /∂Pt = xt and ∂ (D1,t −D0,t) /∂Pt =
−xt , the sharing rule is
(1− δ) (D1,t −D0,t) = δ (Sπ,t − Sg,t)
Goods surplus
Gt = (Sπ,t − Sg,t) + (D1,t −D0,t)
= v(xt)− Ω+ (1− τ − λt)1− s
1 + r
Et [Sπ,t+1 − Sg,t+1]
+σ(et)− etσ￿(et) + (1− τ)1− s
1 + r
Et [D0,t+1 −D1,t+1]
Gt = v(xt)− Ω+ σ(et)− etσ￿(et)
+(1− τ)1− s
1 + r
EtGt+1 − λt1− s
1 + r
Et [Sπ,t+1 − Sg,t+1]
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Under regular assumptions on the eﬀort cost function σ(e), it will be the case that
eσ￿(e) = ησσ(e) where ησ > 0 is the elasticity of the eﬀort cost function.
Gt = v(xt) + (1− ησ)σ(e)− Ω+ [(1− τ)− (1− δ)λt] 1− s
1 + r
EtGt+1
Negotiated price P
In order to solve for the price, we equate the firm’s surplus Sπ,t − Sg,t = (1− δ)Gt to
the previous expression for the goods surplus
(1−δ)Gt = (1−δ) [v(xt) + (1− ησ)σ(e)− Ω]+(1−δ) [(1− τ)− (1− δ)λt] 1− s
1 + r
EtGt+1
(1− δ) [v(xt) + (1− ησ)σ(e)− Ω] + (1− δ) [(1− τ)− (1− δ)λt] 1− s
1 + r
EtGt+1
= Ptxt − Ω+ (1− τ − λt)1− s
1 + r
Et [Sπ,t+1 − Sg,t+1]
Ptxt = (1− δ) [v(xt) + (1− ησ)σ(e)] + δΩ+ (1− δ)λt1− s
1 + r
EtGt+1 − (1− δ)2λt1− s
1 + r
EtGt+1
Ptxt = (1− δ) [v(xt) + (1− ησ)σ(e)] + δΩ+ (1− δ)λt1− s
1 + r
Et [δGt+1]
Recall that δGt = D1,t−D0,t, that from the optimal choice of eﬀert 11+rEt [D1,t+1 −D0,t+1] =
σ￿(et)
λ˜t
, and that from the properties of the goods matching function we have that
λt
λ˜t
= ξt.
Ptx = (1− δ) [v(xt) + (1− ησ)σ(et) + (1− s)σ￿(et)ξt] + δΩ
Search Eﬀort and disposable income
From now on, assume that
v(xt) = Φxt
Optimal search eﬀort is determined by the condition. The optimal individual search
eﬀort is simply given by a condition equating the marginal cost of eﬀort to the dis-
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counted, expected benefit yielded by that marginal unit of eﬀort:
σ￿(e¯t) =
λ˜t
1 + r
Et [D1,t+1 −D0,t+1]
Usinge the recursivity of the expression
D1,t −D0,t = (Φ− Pt) xt + σ(et)− etσ￿(et) + (1− τ)1− s
1 + r
EtL−1 [D1,t −D0,t]
where L−1 is the forward operator. Defining ψ ≡ (1 − τ) 1−s1+r a discount factor and
σ˜(et) ≡ σ(et)− etσ￿(et), we have
D1,t −D0,t = (Φ− Pt) xt + σ˜(et) + (1− τ)1− s
1 + r
EtL−1 [D1,t −D0,t]
[D1,t −D0,t]
￿
1− ψEtL−1
￿
= (Φ− Pt) xt + σ˜(et)
[D1,t −D0,t] = 1
[1− ψEtL−1] [(Φ− Pt) xt + σ˜(et)]
[D1,t −D0,t] = Et
￿
i=0
ψi [(Φ− Pt+i) xt+i + σ˜(et+i)]
We know that a matched consumer will spend all disposable income Y dt on good c1,t.
Thus income Y dt can purchase c1,t = xt = Y dt /Pt goods and we have
[D1,t −D0,t] = Et
￿
i=0
ψi
￿
(Φ− Pt+i) Y
d
t+i
Pt+i + σ˜(et+i)
￿
[D1,t −D0,t] = Et
￿
i=0
ψi
￿￿
Φ
Pt+i − 1
￿
Y dt+i + σ˜(et+i)
￿
This expression clearly ties the surplus to a consumption relationship for the con-
sumer to the future expected paths of disposable income and the price. Plugging this
expression in the condtion for optimal consumer search eﬀort:
σ￿(e¯t) =
λ˜t
1 + r
Et
￿
i=0
ψi
￿￿
Φ
Pt+1+i − 1
￿
Y dt+1+i + σ˜(et+1+i)
￿
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C Allowing for savings or borrowing
C.1 Case 1
We have the new budget constraint per period, with rs the rate of return on savings,
assumed to be less than r:
Ptc1,t + c0,t + st = Y dt + st−1(1 + rs)
If the consumer expect a drop in price next period, he may not want to consume
everything today in order to consume more of the numeraire next period. Hence, we
have
Ptc1,t + st = Ptxt
Bellman equations for unmatched and matched consumers:
D0,t = c0,t + st−1(1 + rs)− σ(et) + 1
1 + r
Et
￿
etλ˜tD1,t+1(st) + (1− λ˜tet)D0,t+1(st)
￿
= Y dt + st−1(1 + rs)− σ(et) +
1
1 + r
Et
￿
etλ˜tD1,t+1(st) + (1− λ˜tet)D0,t+1(st)
￿
D1,t = v(c1,t) + Y
d
t − Ptc1,t + st−1(1 + rs) +
￿
1− s
1 + r
￿
Et [τD0,t+1(st) + (1− τ)D1,t+1(st)]
+
s
1 + r
EtD0,t+1(st)
= v(xt − st/Pt) + Y dt − Ptxt + st−1(1 + rs) +
￿
1− s
1 + r
￿
Et [τD0,t+1(st) + (1− τ)D1,t+1(st)]
+
s
1 + r
EtD0,t+1(st)
The solution for the optimal choice of savings is a trade-oﬀ between sacrificing
consumption today, which costs
v￿(xt − st/Pt)
Pt
and to raise consumption opportunities tomorrow, which yields additional utility
depending on the future state. In particular, in state 0, we have
dEtD0,t+1(st)
dst
= 1 + rs
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and
dEtD1,t+1(st)
dst
= 1 + rs
since he is constrained by the production tomorrow for his consumption next period.
Hence without calculation, we know that the consumer does not want to save: what
he gains tomorrow is only to consume more numeraire, which by definition costs
him a fixed price. So at best, he gains some more numeraire tomorrow which brings
(1 + rs)/(1 + r)<1 but sacrifices v
￿(xt−st/Pt)
Pt which is larger than 1: marginal utility is
above 1, prices must be below 1.
C.2 Other cases
1. A slightly diﬀerent reasonning applies if the agent could store good 1 in case
he returned to stage 0. In this case the agent may have an interest to smooth
consumptions. But good 1 was assumed to be non-storable.
2. By the same logic, one may want to know whether the agents could borrow in
bot stages at rate rb, to consume more of the numeraire. Again, this is not
possible given (1 + rb)/(1 + r)>1. The key insight here is that borrowing or
savings is of no help because the agents are constrained to buy all the available
goods.
3. Finally, a last possibility would be to have unconstrained agents, who would
consume, when matched, both good 1 and the numeraire. In this case, they
may want to reduce consumption of good 1 in periods of high prices and raise
it in period of low price. However even in this case, this is not profitable:
postponing consumption of good 1 today entails a risk: that of loosing the good
with probability τ . The gain is to have some more consumption of the good,
by a marginal quantity equal deflation. In the numerical exercise, this marginal
quantity has to be discounted by (1−τ)/(1+r) and compared to deflation. Given
that deflation is typically at most 0.5% quarterly in our simulation and that τ
is 1%, the consumer, in this case, would still not want to sacrifice consumption
of good 1 today to buy more good 1 tomorrow.
37
